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Abstract
This article mainly consists o f  an analysis o f  the successive historical expansions o f  the mechanistic 
and the organistic world pictures into world views. In conclusion the presently popular form  o f the 
organistic world view, New Age occultism, is compared with the 'traditional' African world view. In 
this way the author attempts to realise three different aims: firstly to show how world pictures, 
developed within specific disciplines, are transformed into world views by expansionary application 
in other disciplines a n d /o r  cultural areas; secondly that occultism  is regaining intellectual 
respectability by presenting itself as part o f  the ‘new’ organistic, scientific view o f  the world; and  
thirdly that there are strong similarities between the new Western occultism and the traditional 
African world view (which opens up possibilities o f  synthesis between these two).
1. INTRODUCTION
We are faced with a surge of occultism today. The new occultism, although showing 
some oriental traits, has its roots squarely in the W estern intellectual tradition. It is 
part of the organistic reaction to the mechanistic world view, and actually only a return 
of an earlier, organistic, and at times, occultist way of thought.
One aim of this paper is to show how expansionary application of what was originally 
only an explanatory picture within a specific discipline, transforms that picture into a 
full-blown world view for the practice of science. Historically, this also implies the 
supplanting of the mechanistic by the organistic view in intellectual circles.
* World picture is used in a restricted sense in this article. In its expanded meaning 
the G erm an equivalent, Weltbild, includes in its meaning representations of the 
origin and structure of the world, its creatures, and even social relationships (cf.
1 The financial assistance of the Institute for Research Development of the HSRC is hereby 
gratefully acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions drawn are (hose of the author 
and do not necessarily reflect (hose of the IRD or the HSRC.
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Griffioen, 1989:84). In this context, however, we use it in the sense of a scientific 
world picture, such as the Newtonian representation of the world, with special 
accentuation of the pictorial aspect, i. e., the term is used to convey a picture of 
something within human experience, namely, the physical, astronomical universe, 
which is not fully contained in human experience.
* World view refers to "a total vision of life, implying certa in  key categorical 
distinctions about the world and giving its adherents a fundamental orientation to 
life" (Griffioen, 1989:84). In this case the accent falls on view - a total vision, with 
pictorial, conceptual, practical power, and even commitment aspects.
A further aim is to show that occultism regained intellectual respectability by being 
part and parcel of the new organistic world picture, which has its roots in twentieth- 
century scientific theories (specifically the new physics). Occultism simply presents itself 
as a kind o f spirituality which is in keeping with contemporary science (and thus takes a 
spiritual ride on the wave of Western faith in scientific power), and through this, as the 
alternative to the sp iritual em ptiness (exposed in the practical fa ilures) o f the 
mechanistic world picture.
Finally, we intend to show that there are strong similarities between the traditional 
African world view and the organistic one in its occultistic form. This is actually only an 
addition to show the relevance of the world view debate for the African situation; for 
apart from the fact that the mentioned similarities pose a challenge to the Christian 
academic, it is also true that philosophising in Africa calls for a kind of Afrocentrism, 
as Gericke (Anon., 1991:7) has so aptly argued.
2. FROM  M ONANTHEUIL T O  SUMNER: T H E  G RO W TH  O F  T H E  MECHA­
NISTIC W ORLD PICTURE INTO A WORLD VIEW
2.1 Ancient philosophy
The ancient Greek philosophers pictured the world as a living being; hellenistic Neo­
Platonism saw it as an em anation from the Supreme being, whatever he was called. 
The la tter theory was especially popularised into an occult religion in the Corpus 
Hermeticum - occultism and the idea of ‘nature’ as a ‘living-being’ mutually strength­
ened one another: it expressed the potential of the world to grow into perfection. This 
‘living-being’-p icture was prim arily used to  explain the physical universe: all of 
‘nature’, but especially astronomical entities were supposed to be alive, yet Aristotle
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(whose teleological use of this picture was decisively influential) still distinguished 
quite clearly betw een nature  (physis) and its im itation, culture (techne). Some 
medieval Christian philosophers followed the G reek concept of nature, which they 
combined with the Christian idea of the creator, and this led to the Roman Catholic 
conception of nature as the p artn er of God. The sam e picture is still found in 
Paracelsus’s idea of living matter with its organizing Archeus (even though he rejected 
the Aristotelian hylemorphism) (Dijksterhuis, 1950:307ff). This world view implied 
that creative powers were structurally inherent in the world - this of course endangered 
the biblical distinction between God and his creatures ,(cf Hooykaas, 1972:1-12).
2.2 The seventeenth century
In the latter half of the sixteenth century, however, a new world picture was invented: 
"The world is a machine; it is the most purposeful and beautiful instrument", says H. de 
Monantheuil in 1599 (Hooykaas, 1972:61). His more famous contemporary, Johannes 
Kepler, was switching from the one picture to the o ther at about the same time. 
Hooykaas argues that this new world picture was more in keeping with the biblical idea 
of creation, because it supposed the idea of an engineer or designer. This excluded 
both the organistic world picture (the idea that the world has designs of its own), as 
well as the materialism of the Epicureans (which bases all configurations of atoms on 
pure accident). Such was also the position defended by Basso, Boyle and others in the 
seventeenth century. According to Boyle (1627-1692), for example, God is directly 
involved, not only in the original creation of m atter, but also in the order which 
determines the perm anent mechanical behaviour of m atter (Dijksterhuis, 1950:478). 
Hooykaas admits that this picture also allowed for a deistic interpretation, in which the 
engineer retires directly after the machine has started operating. This possibility - the 
one that won the battle in the end - is clearly implied even in a formulation of Boyle:
(The universe) is like a rare clock ... where all things arc so skilfully contrived that the engine 
being once set moving, all things proceed according to the artificers design. (In: McKay, 1974: 
cover.)
Their elder contemporary, Descartes (1596-1650) expanded and popularised the new 
world picture in defending the hypothesis that not only inorganic but also organico- 
physical entities - excluding thought - are machines. Note that the application of the 
initial picture or metaphor has expanded: it originated as a picture of the astronomical 
universe, explaining the motions of the heavenly bodies without ascribing souls or 
divine powers to them . But D escartes extended the picture to include the bodily
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aspects of living beings (cf. Mason, 1956:134ff). Descartes was actually defending the 
excellence of thought in this way - the creativity of man, as Chomsky has it. The point 
he was trying to make was that animals are only machines (constructs of m atter and 
motion), for
... never was a beast found which is so perfect, thal he used any sign to  make anything known (o 
other animals, which has no relation to his passions, and there is no man so imperfect, that he 
doesn’t do i t ... I know that the beasts are often better than we are, but it doesn’t astonish me, 
for this serves for me to prove that they act naturally and spring-driven, just like a clock, which 
shows the time better lhan our judgement can tell it to us (Descartes, Oeuvres 3.575-576).
But he had set an example of the expansion of a world picture outside its initial area of 
application - somebody else would soon take this further. Julien Offray de la Mettrie 
played games with Descartes’s doctrine. On the one hand he attacks Descartes for 
stating that animals are ‘only’ machines; according to him, they exhibit the same ability 
as human beings to feel, think, communicate and reason, and are, therefore, "more 
than only machines" (Gunderson, 1963:64; De la Mettrie, Oeuvres Philosophiques 2.29­
30) On the other hand he attacks Descartes for making man more than a machine - 
this, he says, is no more than a ploy to satisfy theologians, as the human body is really 
only a very skilfully constructed watch, and there is no real distinction between thought and 
body:
I believe that thought is so little incompatible with organized matter, lhat it seems to be one of 
the properties on a par with electricity, the faculty of motion, impenetrability, extension, etc. (De 
la Mettrie, 1953:143-4.)
De la M ettrie thus proposes outright m aterialism  as a  defence for his mechanistic 
conception of man.
2 3  The eighteenth century
The mechanistic world picture was expanded once more in the eighteenth century, as 
can be seen from the econom ic theories o f A dam  Sm ith , the  fa ther o f capitalist 
economic theory, and Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of history and politics. Both these 
thinkers view the processes concerned (economic, cultural, political action) almost in 
La Mettrien terms. They presuppose a  teleology of ‘nature’ which is more than mecha­
nical, and rather consistent with an organistic picture of the totality. But the way in 
which nature  goes about realising its p lan  is purely m echanical, and shows the 
influence of the gravitational equilibrium model o f the astronomer Isaac Newton (who 
himself rejected the mechanistic picture precisely because it allowed for deistic and 
even atheistic interpretations (cf Dijksterhuis, 1950:314ff)).
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23.1 Adam Smith
A dam Smith followed the organistic idea of the harmonia praestabilita of Leibniz in as 
far as the totality of the cosmos was concerned. He, however, believed that we human 
beings are not able to draw the implications of that for our practical life. Thus he 
distinguishes between G od’s final causality (nature leading the totality to its divinely 
determined goal) and human efficient causality (nature’s instrument for reaching that 
goal). The la tter is realised especially via selfinterest: if the individual takes the 
responsibility for selfpreservation and propagation of the species onto himself (Smith, 
1976:292), and act conscientiously in this
... we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and 
may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to  advancc, as far as in 
our power, the plan of Providence (Smith, 1976:166.)
Smith searches for a direct way in which we can distinguish right from wrong. This he 
finds in agreeability for the instincts and passions (sensualist hedonism) - reason is too 
indirect and utility-oriented to provide general rules (Smith, 1976:506). Self-interest is 
governed by the internal, imaginary-objective impartial spectator, judging on the basis 
of prudence (longterm self-interest) and justice (social interest) (Smith, 1976:130ff; 
174ff; 213ff). Conscientious self-interest is the most im portant way to progress, for 
most of society is not acting on a rational level, but rather on the level of the passions 
of ambition and prestige (Smith, 1976: 41ff; 107ff; 114ff; 145ff). Society, he objects to 
his teacher, Hutcheson, does not need benevolence as its basis:
Socicty may subsist among men, as among different merchants, from a sense of utility, without 
any mutual love or affection; and though no man in it be bound in gratitude to any other, it may 
still be upheld by a m ercenary exchange of good offices according to  an agreed valuation.
(Smith, 1976:86.)
This we can only understand once we know that Adam Smith follows the tradition of 
Hobbes and Rousseau in accepting the contractual view of society - in Smith’s case 
clearly based on an economistically interpreted contractual view of man. Man is by 
nature a hawker: he has the "propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for 
another'', i. e. to conclude contracts (Smith, 1950:15). It is the exchange of "good 
offices" which is the foundation of society. And it is the exchange of goods and services 
which provides the material base for all progress in society. Through the process of 
contracting, in which of course every party competes for his own interest, the "agreed 
valuations" are established: in the trade context Smith calls this the market price. But
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the market price has a point towards which it tends, being pushed and pulled by buyers 
and sellers, namely real cost (which includes rent of land, wages of labour, and profits 
of capital) - the natural price. The Newtonian influence (mentioned above) becomes 
clear in the context of Smith’s doctrine on the relationship between the market price 
and the natural price, and specifically in the metaphor of gravitation:
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the prices of commodities 
are continually gravitating. Different accidents may sometimes keep them suspended a good 
deal above it, and sometimes force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be 
the obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and continuance, they are 
constantly tending towards it. (Smith, 1950:60.)
This idea of a natural centre of gravity which works as an equilibrating force does not 
only apply to economics: it dates from Smith’s earliest extant writings and was first 
applied to the scientific investigation as the re-establishment of disturbed equilibrium 
of the mind: the principle of agreeability, which we also find in his ethics (Smith, cf 
1980).
23.2 Kant
Kant applies the same structure of a natural, organistic teleology, a conflict/competit­
ion model of progress, and a final, outomatic equilibrium as the positive outcome to 
politics and history. In his case, however, it is not the repeated ebb and flow between 
equilibrium and disequilibrium which is at stake, but a longterm struggle which finally 
ends in a self-sustaining equilibrium. But the conflictual process that leads to this is 
determined just as much by sheer mechanical necessity as the automatic, self-sustaining 
peace machine which is the outcome.
The natural destination of the human species, according to Kant, is progress towards 
perfection (which means that all the natural talents are  to  be developed) (Kant, 
1975a:92; Kant, 1975b:35-45). This development is teleological, but it already appears 
as if teleology is executed mechanically here:
It does not m atter how we metaphysically conceive of the freedom  of the hum an will; the 
appearances thereof, namely the actions of man, are determined under the force of natural law, 
precisely like any other natural e v en t... Individual people, and even whole nations, do not often 
think about the fact they, while striving every one in his own way and often in conflict with one 
another each for his own goal, unconsciously follow the goal of nature (which is unknown to 
them), as if they are on leading-strings, and are involved in the promotion of that which, if it 
were known to them, would not have much significance for them. (Kant, 1975:33.)
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According to Kant it is conflict which guarantees internal freedom (in this he follows 
M achiavelli) and, through the pressure o f necessary survival provisions, ensures 
cultural progress. Although reason is at work in this, nature takes care behind the 
screens that man has no choice but to use autonomous reason (Kant, 1975:36-9). But 
as is continually the case with Smith’s competitive, contractual society, so also but once 
and for all, in some Kantian new Jerusalem is it with Kant’s conflictual view of history 
and politics: a  situation develops in which war becomes impossible, and conflict of 
interest is nicely embedded in a set of contractual rules which balances pressure with 
peace: '
All wars are, therefore, so many altempts (truly not in the intentions of the people but in those 
of nature), to establish new relationships among states. ... until in the end, in part by structuring 
of the best possible legal o rder, in part by communal external agreem ent and legislation, a 
situation is established which maintains itself analogously to civil society, just like an automat. ... 
the barbarous freedom of the already established states ... necessitates our species to  find, in 
addition to the in itself salutary resistance o f many states, a law of equilibrium and a  united 
force to support such law; that is, to impose a cosmopolilanistic situation of public state security; 
one that is not totally without danger, so that the powers of m an would doze off, but also not 
without a principle of equality for their interaction, so that they will not disturb one another. 
(Kant, 1975b:44.)
In Kant, reason is the capability of autonomous choice, evaluation, and the setting of 
goals, and is incorporated as such in the inevitable process of perfection of the human 
species. But the machine picture of the world, here (as in Smith) melted into the 
motive of conflict/com petition (the expression of the passions of greed, ambition, 
selfishness), neutralises this autonomy: cultural progress, political relationships, a 
league of nations - all are the products of and sustained by a mechanism, based like a 
clockwork or a chemical balance, on the gravitational equilibrium model. And it is 
m ore than  figurative speech here , for the processes involved are  construed as 
automatic and inevitable.
2.4 The nineteenth century
Without analysing them intensively, I may add that the mechanism of a survival struggle 
was adopted by Darwin via Malthus, and again used together with an equilibrium idea 
to describe or explain the origin of species. Interestingly, although some Darwinists 
love to pretend that Darwin succeeded in producing a fully materialistic theory, in 
which no place was left for any teleology, and, therefore, every event is accidental, it is 
clear from his own formulations of the natural selection principle, that he was still very
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much imbued with the belief in progress and the teleological basis of it; so that, even 
though the mechanistic approach was dominating his thought, he did not succeed in 
eliminating it completely: he derives from Malthus the population principle which is 
transform ed into the principle of natural selection - the la tter takes care that "the 
vigorous, the healthy, and the happy survive and multiply" (Darwin, 1901:69-70).
The mechanistic approach provided Darwin with a model to biologize and mechanize 
ethics, by equilibrating shortterm  and longterm  instincts not very unlike Sm ith’s 
impartial spectator balancing personal and social interests in his imagination. Darwin’s 
theory of evolution provided Freud with an equally mechanistic theory of psychical 
equilibria and disequilibria, as well as an equilibrium theory of the ego (the point of 
balance between super-ego and id). It also provided the social Darwinists with the cut­
throat idea o f  justice and economic competition - Sum ner (who was, apart from a 
pioneer social scientist, paradoxically a trained presbyterian theologian) states it thus:
[Many econom ists] seem  to be terrified that distress and misery still rem ain on earth  and 
promise to remain as long as the vices of human nature remain. Many of them are frightened at 
liberty, especially under the form of competition ... They think it bears harshly on the weak.
They do not perceive that here "the stro n g ' and 'th e  weak’ are term s which adm it o f no 
definition unless they are made equivalent to the industrious and the idle, the frugal and the 
extravagant. They do not perceive, furthermore, that if we do not like the survival of the Fittest, 
we have only one possible alternative, and that is the survival of the unfittcst. The former is the 
law of civilization; the latter is the law of anticivilization. We have our choicc between the two, 
or we can go on, as in the past, vacillating between the two, but a th ird  plan - the socialist 
desideratum - a plan for nourishing the unfittest and yet advancing in civilization, no man will 
ever find. (Sumner, 1934:56.)
According to Sumner progress (civilization) is the product of competitive selection, 
which is a natural law analogous to the law of gravitation.
25  Conclusion
To summarise: the mechanistic world picture came into being, probably using all kinds 
of sixteenth century ‘autom atic’ toys and gadgets, but especially the clock and the 
balance, to explain the functioning of the astronomical universe; thus replacing the 
idea that this universe might be a living being. Understandably, before the advent of 
inorganic automats, it was difficult to explain the movement of the heavenly bodies 
otherwise than with reference to living beings, for they were apparently moving without 
any external source of movement. But as the organistic approach too easily flowed 
over into pantheism , the appearance of the autom at, as an inorganic entity which
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apparently moves itself, immediately provided a picture of the astronomical universe as 
inorganic yet self-moving, and presupposing an external ‘engineer’. The association 
between the machine and the astronomical universe was therefore very strong from a 
Christian, creationalist point of view.
The machine picture was, however, soon expanded to explain the behaviour of that 
which originally provided the explanatory picture for the explanandum, i.e. living 
organisms, like animals and the human body, and soon afterwards, the human essence. 
From there it was expanded to  explain social phenomena, and with the help of the 
conflict motive and Newton’s law of gravitation, transform ed into a model for the 
explanation of man’s political, economic, emotional, and ethical behaviour, and finally 
to explain the progressive advance of species as well as justice. While self-movement 
was still one of the kinships betw een organism and autom at, the organic and the 
inorganic were much further removed from one another than the machine and the 
astronomical universe. And as the machine picture was expanded into areas more 
related to human behaviour than to his structure, both the inorganic, physical aspect 
and the self-m ovem ent was absent from the new area  o f application. In fact, a 
principle o f m otion had to be introduced, namely the conflict motive, in order to 
realise the advance of civilisation as determined by the suppressed, but ever present, 
teleology. Thus the original picture was transferred from its kinship referent to areas 
of vague analogy, covering eventually every aspect of life - i. e. it was transformed from 
a world picture into a world view. And it became a world view which automatised the 
world and society - practically an atheist one, which immanentised salvation in terms of 
progress towards an automatic equilibrium.
This transformation had one important methodological implication, already recognised 
by Hobbes, who in 1642 used the mechanistic world view in his analysis of society. 
Machines can be taken apart and reassembled without much apparent damage to their 
parts. This, of course, is not the case with an organism. But wherever an organism or a 
social community is treated  as if it were a machine, scholarly study will take place 
according to the assemble-disassemble-pattern:
For everything is to  be understood by its constitutive causes. For as in a watch, or some such 
small engine, the matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot be known, except it be taken 
insunder and viewed in its parts; so to make a more curious search into the rights of states and 
duties of subjects, it is necessary, I say, not to take them  insunder, but yet that they be so 
considered as if they were dissolved... (Hobbes, 1978:98-9).
In this context practising medicine becam e a question of isolating some physical 
trouble-part and ‘repairing’ or ‘replacing’ it (whilst the suffering person disappears
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from the scene). Fluctuations on the economic front are handled by adjusting some 
regulating ‘screws’ (forgetting about the complications of the individual home owner or 
consumer). And future shock (intolerable acceleration of change) becomes an object 
of cybernetic self-regulation (as in Toffler, 1978:408ff).
With the return  of the organistic world picture, the m echanistic m odel’s conflict- 
equilibrium approach, as well as its disassembling-assembling method, would all come 
into the fire-line.
3. FROM ROMANTICISM TO CAPRA: TH E RETURN O F T H E  ORGANISTIC 
WORLD VIEW
The slogan of Romanticism, ‘Back to nature’, has a much deeper meaning than may at 
first appear. It is not simply a call to return to the simple life of rural or primitive man, 
to flee from the rush and evil of urban life. O ne should realise that ‘nature’, in the 
(preceding) Enlightenment, referred to a man-centred yet man-transcending teleology, 
which, in some authors, may have expressed a longing for the Robinson Crusoe life 
style, but in others an idealisation of the refined ways of the nobility at the royal court. 
In the teleology of nature the original Greek idea of physis is still present, but now in a 
post-Christian, secular-hum anist, rationalist, soteriological context. Romanticism 
hooked  on to  th is  concep t o f na tu re , bu t tr ied  to  rid itse lf  o f the rig id ity  of 
Enlightenment quasi-mathematical rationalism by stressing the Robinson Crusoe side 
of ‘nature’: instincts, passions, sense experience, within the surroundings of rural 
nature.
3.1 Bergson
Nineteenth-century Romanticism was to be the prelude to the rehabilitation of the 
organistic world picture in twentieth century intellectual circles. The famous French 
evolutionist Henri Bergson could no more accept that living species originated, one 
from the other, by purely mechanical means. Instead he finds the élan vitale (the life 
impulse) to be the prime mover of the evolutionary process. There is, however, no 
rectilinear development, no guaranteed progress (Bergson, 1922:89ff). The ways of the 
life impulse cannot be traced by calculative reason, but only by intuition; it finds its 
own ways, much like a creeper plant finds its branch-paths (1922:107ff). Bergson 
applied the opposition between the rational (which, for him, equals the mechanistic.
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bit-by-bit, approach) and the intuitive (which intuits the ‘parts’ in term s o f their 
meaning within a whole context), not only to our understanding of biological evolution, 
but to  scholarship in general, and to the areas of ethics and religion (1922:196ff). 
Bergson was already, therefo re , expanding the life im pulse p rincip le  in to  non- 
biological areas.
32. Popular literature
At about the same time the idea that the earth is a living being was reviving on a more 
popular level in books by W.W. Atkinson, U. Buchanan, Richard Ingalese, O. Hashnu 
Hara, Joseph Ralph, Jam es Robertson, R. Rimsdale Stocker, L. Dow Balliet, W. de 
Voe and Pauline E. Sayre, (to mention but a few who published in English) and espe­
cially Francis Swiney and a very influential South African lady, Johanna Brand. Both 
these women had been under the influence of the Corpus Hermeticum and other occul- 
tistic writings, and were predicting a time of peace with a much m ore ‘fem inine’ 
approach. The polarist moment inherent in the (sometimes) dialectical, organistic 
approach was returning. (Cf Venter, 1990:59ff.)
3 3  Smuts
If we want to understand some of the present-day formulations of the organistic world 
picture, we cannot ignore the contribution of Jan Christiaan Smuts. It will be difficult 
to classify Smuts as e ith e r organistic or m echanistic, because he re jec ted  both 
approaches and tried to find an alternative somewhere ‘in between’ the two extremes 
(a determination of his position which he might also reject).
Smuts rejected as "a m ere concession to our ignorance” organistic vitalism’s presup­
position of an indwelling substantive force active in living beings, which he said was 
nothing more than  a refinem ent of anim ism (believing in the inherence of sem i­
material spirits in everything) (Smuts, 1929:2). Mechanistic biological theories he also 
considered obsolete, being the remnants o f an older tradition in biology (following 
mechanistic physics), which had not yet adjusted to the [then] recent revolution in 
physics. F or Sm uts this included M inkowski’s theory of the space-tim e-w hole, 
Einstein’s relativity theory, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (cf. Smuts, 1932:3ff). 
The mechanistic picture had been driven out of its original area of application, but was 
still dug in in the secondary ones:
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M echanistic biologists] arc wrong in their view of life largely because they are wrong in their 
view of matter. They still cling to the obsolete billiard ball theory of m atter. They still think, as 
physicists thought a generation ago, that m atter, w hether dead or living, consists of fixed 
unalterable partidcs whose movements and behaviour can be definitely determined on ordinary 
mechanical principles. ... M atter has become immaterial. It now consists of clusters of fickle 
events, and not of hard, impenetrable, unalterable entities. M atter is a flexible scheme, in which 
things remain only as averages, while their details are in a state of flux and change. ... The 
material view of matter is gone, and with it the mechanistic view of life. (Smuts, 1932:4.)
Although Smuts still accepts the fruitfulness of a physicalist approach concerning 
details of life, he does not believe that the mechanistic view of life as such need follow 
from this. For - and this is where his famous holism becomes significant - life is more 
than such detailed reactions, and living things do behave differently from the non-living 
physical and chemical reactions to which they are in the last resort reducible (1932:4). 
In fact, it is the other way round: the elements of m atter are rather more like living 
beings, being divisible into ‘genera’ and ‘species’, and also subject to the principles of 
descent and natural selection (1932:5). This behaviour points to the evolution of the 
total universe as the (paradoxical) negation of the second law of thermodynam ics 
(predicting the rundown of energy-efficiency, like a clock wound up long ago) a 
universe on the upgrade through millions of years, from electrons and protons to 
matter, from inert m atter into organisms, from lower organisms to intelligence, and 
"finally the crowning glory of the human soul or personality making for the City of 
God" (Smuts, 1932:5). What could the solution of this paradox be?
For Smuts the inherent cosmic creativity which defies the second law of therm o­
dynamics is to be found in wholes:
For a whole is m ore than the sum of its parts or constituen ts . W hen elem ents, parts, 
constituents differentiate from an undefined whole, they become creative, they produce more 
than they themselves are. C reation rem ains the keyword of the universe, but we have to 
transform the traditional concept and to base it more securely. The rise and progress of wholes 
would necessarily mean an advancing creative order of things, such as the evolutionary universe 
of science appears to be. The category of the whole or Holism therefore seems to supply the 
key for which we are looking. It is the very antithesis of M echanism . A mechanism  is a 
combination of independent unalterable parts, in which the aggregate is the exact equivalent of 
the parts, no m ore and no less. ... The real universe is holistic ... In a whole the parts or 
constituents are not independent entities ... [they] are under the influence of each other as well 
as the whole which they form ... (Smuts, 1929:6).
Smuts presents us with the abstract concept of Holism for the solution of the paradox 
that the universe, also in its m aterial aspect, seems to contradict the second law of 
thermodynamics; i. e., had the world really been a machine, it ought to have been
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running down, but exactly the opposite is happening. Even in the inorganic world we 
find the creativity of wholes (1929:7; 1932:12ff). Smuts (1929:8) supposes a whole 
hierarchy of wholes, more complex wholes being the ‘emergents’ of less complex ones:
From this very complcx whole new characters and properties arise as emergents. In the way of 
characters, activity, and behaviour there is far m ore in this organic whole than there  is in the 
material parts constituting it. This more, this emergent surplus, is life. Life is not in its parts, 
but arises from the synthesis of the parts, and appears in new emergent qualities and modes of 
behaviour. Life is nothing but the emergent behaviour o f  certain advanced types o f  wholes (italics 
added], •
Thus life is, according to Smuts, still no more than an aspect or way of functioning of 
matter. His discovery is a metaphysical one: the more complex the organisation of 
matter, the more creative it is. Smuts’s holism works by doubling analogical thinking: 
viewing the elem ents of m atter as wholes rem iniscent o f living wholes, and then 
expanding the creativity of m aterial w holes to  living w holes through increasing 
complication. Smuts still refers to natural selection (even in material entities) and the 
restoration of equilibrium in organic beings, and has clearly not discarded the idea of 
progress. In the process of concept reformation, which Smuts had started, these terms 
would soon be discarded, or limited in their application. This is very significant for our 
understanding of the New Age Movement.
3.4 Deviation: Hegel
The holistic approach is inherent in the organistic world picture - although he had no 
name for it, we already find it early in the nineteenth century in Hegel. Hegel, in spite 
of his rationalism, could not accept the eighteenth century mechanistic world picture. 
H e constantly objected to the separation of concepts from one another, and tried to 
find their organic unity by deducing them from one another. According to him, the 
concept is a living thing (cf. Hegel, 1969,1:17,21,97). He uses the dialectical approach 
precisely to  give expression to the living growth of the concept: just as the adult 
organism is not the same as the seed, and yet what is in the seed is disclosed and 
inherent in the adult; so also, and primarily so, with the concept (1969,1:21). This is 
what motivates his criticism of the principium identitatis in logic (1969,11:35-80). And 
(in contrast to a machine), a living organism cannot be disassembled and reassembled: 
its m em bers only function as parts of a whole, and decompose almost immediately 
when removed. Hegel’s idea of the cosmic process is one in which the Idea or Concept 
discloses itself by unfolding into ever more encompassing wholes:
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As externality the living thing is capable of such relationships [mechanical, chemical, whole and 
part], but to that extent it is not living existence; if the living thing is taken as a whole which 
consists of parts, as a thing such that it is subject to mechanical or chem ical causality, as 
mechanical or chem ical product ... then Concept is taken as external to it, it is taken  as 
something dead. Because Concept is immanent in it, the teleodetermination of the living thing is 
to be taken as inherent. ... This objectivity of the living is organism ; it is the m eans and  
instrument of the goal, fully goal-determined, since Concept is its substance; it is ... realised goal 
.... Outwardly the organism is a plurality not of parts, but of members, which as such only exists 
within the individuality; they are separable, to the extent that they are ex ternal,... but in as far 
as they are separated , they re tu rn  to the mechanical and chemical relationships of general 
objectivity. (Hegel, 1969,11:476.)
The difference between Smuts and Hegel is that for Smuts it is the wholes which are 
creative, also of life, whilst Hegel assumes that it is the life (of the Concept) which is 
creative, and produces the wholes.
3.5 Mussolini
Wherever the organistic picture took root, some kind of living whole had to be found 
as explanatory for the functioning of its members. Of course, our human tendency to 
expand the application of our pictures and symbols into areas more and more unrelat­
ed to their original application can also be seen in the history of the organistic world 
picture: the living wholes found need not be organisms in the ordinary sense of the 
word. The Italian dictator, Mussolini, found good use for Bergson’s organistic world 
picture, as transposed by Sorel, by defining the state as the focal point o f the organic 
whole:
There is no way of exercising a spiritual influence in (he world as a human will dominating the 
will of others, unless one has a conception both of the transient and the specific reality on which 
that occasion is to  be exercised, and o f the  perm anen t and universal reality  in which the 
transient dwells and has its being. T o  know men one must know man, and to  know man one 
must be acquainted with reality and its laws. There can be no conception of the State which is 
not fundamentally a conception of life: philosophy or intuition, system o f ideas evolving within 
the framework of logic or concentrated in a vision or a faith, but always, at least potentially, an 
organic conception o f the world. (Mussolini, 1935:7-8.)
Mussolini m ore or less follows Bergson in his distinction betw een the organically 
spiritual (which creates itself, transcends space and tim e, is universal, national, 
permanent, self-sacrificing, and moral) and the materially physical (which is subject to 
natural law, individual, egocentric, and short-lived). Life finds its true expression only 
within the state (Mussolini, 1935: lOff), which is consciousness, conscience and general 
will all together. Although Mussolini (1935:9) believes that war is ennobling because
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life is action and struggle within the poles of love and hate, white and black, good and 
evil, he expects no progress anymore: we have to live by tradition within the ebb and 
flow of evolution. The state creates the nation by giving it the will to live and the will 
to power (1935:12ff). Having defined the state as the organism, the fascist doctrine 
transformed the organistic picture into a world view:
Fascism, in short, is not a law giver and a founder o f institutions, bu t an educato r and a 
prom otor of spiritual life. It aims at refashioning not only the forms of life but their content - 
man, his character, and his faith. T o  achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and uses 
authority, entering into the soul and ruling with undisputed sway. Therefore it has chosen as its 
emblem the lictor’s rods, the symbol of unity, strength and justice. (Mussolini, 1933:141.)
3.6 The New Age Movement
Not only the Mussolinis found their cue in the organistic world picture. Various others, 
whose integrity is much less in doubt, also found this p icture a ttrac tive  for the 
expressing of a reality apparently not directly akin to living organisms. In spite of the 
fact that Fascism was one of its early offspring, the organistic picture has become 
intellectually respectable again. Following the lines of Smuts’s holism, the dominance of 
wholes and the revolution in physics are combined with evolution to explain the 
progress of the universe. It has been expanded again into a full-blown world view, its 
prime exponent being the neo-romantic New Age Movement o f which I shall discuss 
the basic characteristics (following Venter, 1990: 53ff) in the following paragraphs.
The New Age Movement accentuates the contemporary cultural crisis of the West. We 
are threatened by nuclear warfare, we have both inflation and unemployment, our 
environment is heavily polluted; people feel lonely and under stress. All these are 
practical results of the mechanistic approach. But we are also at the turning point of a 
cultural tradition which has landed up in a cul de sac; we ought to prepare ourselves 
for a new culture that is inevitably on its way. In astrological terms, we are on the 
bridge betw een the Age of Pisces and the Age of Aquarius. F. C apra gives us a 
thorough, organistic analysis o f cultural transitions in the line o f the B onnetian 
catastrophism, as metaphorised in Toynbee and Sorokin, complemented by the Chi­
nese /  Ching philosophy (cf. Capra, 1984:1-36).
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3.6.1 Polarist thought
Directly connected with the idea of a cultural crisis is the return of polarist thought: 
reality is supposed to be a system of oppositions: male versus female, rational versus 
intuitive, physical versus organic, left brain versus right brain, the oriental Yin versus 
Yang. According to the New Agers, W estern culture has for the past two thousand 
years given p re fe ren ce  to  the ha rsh e r poles: the left b ra in , the ra tional, the 
competitive, the masculine, the physical. In the coming Age of Aquarius the more 
sym phathetic values will be dominant: the right brain, intuition, co-operation, the 
feminine, the organic (cf also MacLaine, 1985:14ff; Capra, 1984:17ff).
3.6.2 Anti-substantialism
New Age thought is anti-substantialistic. Like Smuts they adjust their thinking to the 
new physics. The redefinition of mass in terms of energy implies that we cannot, on the 
level of micro-physics, think in terms of individual things as im penetrable mass; only 
energy processes following certain patterns exist (Capra, 1985:66ff). Everything is 
connected with everything else in a non-causal way, and everything mirrors everything 
else holographically (cf. Capra, 1984:72ff). MacLaine (1985:324) in fact approaches a 
kind of Leibnizian monadology in which the m onads (cells) not only m irror the 
universe, but also the past:
Every cell in your body is holding the energy of experience, not only from this lifetime, but every 
lifetime. We always have to keep in mind that our concept of linear time is loo limited. Holo­
graphic time is the actual reality.
3.6.3 Universalist mysticism
This antisubstantialism is connected with a kind of universalist mysticism. This is where 
holism makes its appearance. According to Capra (who uses Lazio’s systems theory as a 
neo-Smutsian holism), all ‘individuals’ are systems which are parts of larger and larger 
systems. He finds the systems theory so attractive since it provides a model in terms of 
which we can think of living beings as processes rather than as substances. Such 
systems show two tendencies: a self-assertive one (by which it maintains its individu­
ality to a certain degree), but also a self-integrating one (whereby it integrates itself 
into a larger whole as an organ or a member). The world is itself such a system, and 
the sm aller systems cannot exist outside the larger ones. But each system has the
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ability of Smuts’s wholes to move beyond itself - a creative ability:
The internal plasticity ... of living systems, whose functioning is controlled by dynamic relations 
rather than rigid mechanical structures, gives rise to a number of characteristic properties that 
can be seen  as d ifferen t aspects o f the sam e dynam ic principle - the principle o f self­
organization. A living organism is a self-organizing system, which means that its order in 
structure and function is not imposed by the environment but is established by the system itself.
... This does not mean that living systems are isolated from their environment; on the contrary, 
they interact with it continually, but this ... does not determ ine their organization. The two 
principal dynamic phenomena of self-organization are self-renewal - the ability of living systems 
continuously to renew  and recycle their components while m aintaining the integrity of their 
overall structure - and self-transccndence - the ability to reach out creatively beyond physical 
and m ental boundaries in the process o f learning, developm ent and evolution. (C apra, 
1984:290.)
3.6.4 Evolutionism
Evolutionism is part and parcel of New Age thought. But it here takes a non-mechanis 
tic form . The survival princip le  (the  com petition  m otive) associated  w ith the 
mechanistic picture has fallen prey to the upswing of the fem inine values (Capra, 
1984:22ff), and the ability for self-transcendence has elim inated  the mechanistic 
equilibrium-expectations. Unlike the closed system of a clockwork, which proceeds in 
accordance with the second law of thermodynam ics (from  order to disorder until 
equilibrium is reached), the living organism is an open system in continuous exchange 
with its environm ent (C apra echoes Smuts) - an exchange known as metabolism, 
through which it maintains its own order and even increases it. This process enables 
the living system to operate in a state of non-equilibrium, which is in turn necessary for 
self-organisation. It is an inherently stable but dynamic system, of which the stability 
lies in its structure (Capra, 1984:291-2). Capra does not totally reject the Darwinian 
concepts: he accepts ‘adaptation’, but says that this is only one aspect of evolution. 
The o ther one is self-transcendence: the creation of new structures and functions 
without any environmental pressures. Competition does exist, but rather in a wider 
context of co-operation amongst organisms. (1984:301-2.)
3.6.5 Pantheism
The levelled systems-idea easily invokes the thought that the earth may be a living 
system too, and with this also the revival of the ancient Gaia-myth, in which the earth is 
projected as the M other-G oddess (which gave life to everything on it, and still
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maintains them). Capra seems to take this new mythology seriously (1984:308-9). In 
fact, it is taken further, and related to non-Western ideas of the levels of mind, which 
ends up almost autom atically in another im portant characteristic of the New Age 
Movement, namely pantheism. Capra’s words are significant:
In the stratified order of nature, individual human minds are embedded in the larger minds of 
social and ecological systems, and these are integrated into the planetary mental system - the 
mind of Gaia - which in turn must participate in some kind of universal or cosmic mind. The 
conceptual framework of the new systems approach is in no way restricted by associating this 
cosmic mind with the traditional idea of God. In the words of Jantsch, ‘God is not the creator, 
but the mind of the universe’. In this view the deity is of course, neither male nor female, nor 
manifest in any personal form, but represents nothing less than the self-organizing dynamics of 
the entire cosmos. (Capra, 1984:317.)
That God is conceived of as the mind of the universe is an ancient Greek myth. Plato 
tried to improve on it by presupposing a higher god than the macro-cosmical mind. 
This kind of myth, in combination with the theory of evolution, cannot but lead to the 
idea that man is a god in himself. MacLaine, combining Neo-Platonism with evolutio­
nism, says that the souls have turned their backs on divine power, and have therefore 
become stuck in the bodies of lower primates. Their only way of salvation is through 
evolution into higher and higher life-forms. In fact, the souls have evolved life in order 
ultimately to realise again their participation in God - they are creating themselves day 
by day. Transm igration of the soul makes its contribution to the purification of the 
soul, but given the soul’s transgression of its own natural laws - it has become subject to 
the law of karm a. (Some New Age Movement thinkers are  heavily influenced by 
oriental thought.) Eventually m an will realise that he is G od in him self (M aclaine, 
1985:265; 358-9).
3.6.6 Occultism and spiritism
One can expect that this kind of pantheism will lead to the acceptance of occult powers 
in nature, and the acceptance of transmigration will lead to spiritism, both of which we 
find very clearly in the New Age Movement. For, once we believe that the universe is 
filled with divine energy, and that it is reflected in every being, then one can argue that 
it may be possible to concentrate that energy into oneself by occult practices. And if 
we assume that the souls transmigrate, then communication with other souls through 
spiritistic means is to be expected. And if we assume that every cell in the body is 
animated and reflects the world holographically, then one can also expect that certain 
rituals may be followed to tap the memories of the cells, or to realign them with the
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great world system. All of this and more is to be found in MacLaine and other New 
Age authors (less so in C apra, who refrains from occultism and spiritism). Capra, 
however, ra ther applies his theories to economics, health science, environm ental 
studies, etcetera. In this way the organistic picture has again been expanded to include 
physics, biology, the health  sciences (including psychology), politics, economics, 
environmental studies, and spirituality. A picture has again been developed into a 
world view. MacLaine (1985:420) formulates this in a few pregnant sentences:
... what the new physicists and ancient mystics were attempting to reconcile in their own minds: 
the reality of consciousness. That the universe and God itself might be just one giant, collective 
‘thought’. And that every bit of inform ation stored in our own consciousness was cross- 
rcferenced with every o ther bit of inform ation, not only in our own consciousness but in 
everybody elsc’s. That the ‘reality’ o f the physical universe was only holographic memory 
patterns in our minds. That time period upon time period lives on in the memory patterns of 
our mental and bodily consciousness. The hologram of that consciousness enables us to feel one 
w ith the  un iverse  and one with everyth ing  we have experienced. W e a re  in ‘rea lity ’ 
multidimensional beings who each reflect the totality of the whole. ... If I could know me, I 
could know the universe. As the new physics and the ancient mystics now seemed to agree ... 
that we are in fact only dancing with our own consciousness. ... We are all participating in the 
dance. When I began to sec the world with carmic consciousness, the knowledge that we all 
create our own paths ... made me recognize the cosmic justice in everything. ... there was a 
purposeful good in everything ... The total understanding and realization o f myself might take 
e o n s ... to accomplish. But when ... achieved, I will be aligned completely with that Divine Force 
that we call God. ... I know  that I exist, therefore I AM. I know  that the G od-source exists. 
Therefore IT IS. Since I am part o f that force, then I AM that I AM. T o  me, understanding 
spiritual principles is identical to understanding scientific principles. The tw o ... are searching 
for the same answer: W hat is God? ... As far as my own life is concerned, my higher self is with 
me every moment. W hen I get in trouble, I consult with it.
3.7 Conclusion
Note that the agreem ent between the new physics and ‘ancient mystics’ is stressed 
repeatedly in New Age literature. Thus, with the help of the new, organistic criticism 
(under the influence of new physical theories) of the mechanistic picture, ancient 
mysticism (and together with this, magic and spiritism), is given intellectual decency by 
riding the wave of Western scientism. In this way a new spirituality can be introduced 
into scholarship - the expansion of the ‘living being’-picture to every aspect of life, 
introduces the divine. New Age criticism of ‘scientism’ has to be recognised for what it 
is: pantheistic scientism criticising mechanistic scientism.
The organistic world view will introduce the kind of spontaneous growth principle that 
we find in the works o f D.H. Lawrence - one which does not allow for much logical
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self-criticism . The ‘in ternal creativity’ of the cosmos will both imply a mystical 
approach to nature, enforce evolution as a soteriological science, and tend to repris- 
tinate towards (an impossible) neo-primitivism, which may misjudge the seriousness of 
the problems of a high-tech culture, and the need for a responsible reform ational 
attitude towards it. (It is probably, in terms of the logic of organism, not surprising that 
D.H. Lawrence despised urban technological culture and preferred instinctual sexuality 
and primitive religions as the better alternatives.)
4. T H E  A FR IC A N  W O R L D  V IEW  A N D  T H E  M EC H A N ISM -O R G A N ISM  
DEBATE
In trying to find the essential characteristics o f traditional African thought, we may 
generalise too much. Within the scope of this paper, it is not possible to individualise 
or even particularise the ideas to cover even a representative number of ethnic groups. 
I have rather tried to find common world view traits amongst a  few groups who live far 
apart (without thereby implying that every trait identified occurs in every single ethnic 
group in Sub-Saharan Africa) - this is in the same line as Anyanwu’s (1984a:77) search 
for the common epistemological presuppositions, although it goes somewhat further.
Within the generalising approach followed here, African thought will prove to be much 
nearer to the organistic model than to  the mechanistic one. In as far as President 
Kaunda rightly lamented the substitution of Western values for good African traditions 
at the ICPCHE conference in Lusaka in 1987, we have to  state that the organistic 
world view is inherently m ore dangerous for Africa than the mechanistic one, both 
because it has regained decency in intellectual circles, and because it shows several 
sim ilarities with general tendencies in A frican thought. The form er has received 
enough attention above; the similarities are important to focus upon.
4.1 Theism - Pantheism
The African conception of the Supreme G od is dialectically theistic, in the sense that 
both his pervasive presence in and his distance from creation is stressed. In Karanga 
idiom: "God is in all things, and God is far, far away" (Aschwanden, 1989:210ff; cf. also 
Anyanwu, 1984b:163ff). In fact, one finds here a  reverse anthropomorphism or even a 
theomorphic view of man and world, and God and the world are ultimately one (Asch­
wanden, 1989:211-2; cf. also Ruch, 1984:120ff;150ff). Usually the remoteness of God is
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stressed possibly to account for the role of ancestors as near-causes and intermediaries 
(cf. for example Bourdillon,1987:277ff; or, about the Zulu: Berglund, 1976:42ff) but an 
explanation of God’s religious remoteness will not detract much from his ontological 
presence as the source of everything. And exactly on this point the African traditional 
idea of God may approach New Age pantheism. Some Shona (Zimbabwe) and Zulu 
(South A frica) myths represen t the m an-wom an-relationship as a likeness of the 
relationship betw een the Suprem e God and the earth  (cf. Aschwanden, 1989:26ff; 
Berglund, 1976: 33ff), whilst the Tallensi (Ghana) see earth as a living thing and the 
Ibo (Nigeria) represent it as mother (Parrinder, 1968:23), thus approaching the New 
Age G aia myth. ‘
4.2 Vital force
According to the basic thesis of P. Tempels (1953), in which he is followed by L. 
Apostel (1981), B.J. van der Walt (1978), Anyanwu (1984b), and (hesitantly by) Ruch 
(1984), the main category of A frican ontology is vital force. V ital force declines 
hierarchically, down from God, through the ancestral spirits and hum an beings, 
anim als, p lants and even inan im ate things (V an der W alt, 1978:32; Parrinder, 
1968:21ff; Ruch, 1984:145ff; cf also the power lineage amongst the Zulu: Berglund, 
1976:246ff). This implies that the African ontology is in fact spiritualistic-organistic, 
and very close to that of Shirley MacLaine. Occult practices and divination are part 
and parcel of African life, because that is the way to acquire as much as possible vital 
force (which has a link with bodily health and strength; cf Parrinder, 1968:113ff).
43 Ritual re-enactment
The trad itiona l A frican views history as cyclical, reflecting his nearness to , and 
dependence upon, primeval nature with its cycles of day and night, the moon, the 
seasons. Ritual re-enacts this cyclical history, and in this way strives to re-present the 
origin of the tribe in the original act of creation, thus mustering as much life force as 
possible (Ruch, 1984:108ff; Van der Walt, 1978:33-4; 1990:40ff). In this way ‘universal’ 
history can be reflected in the present, and we are faced with another analogue of New 
Age thought - that which MacLaine calls holographic time.
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4.4 Ancestor veneration
Ancestor veneration is a well-known trait of African thought (Van der Walt, 1978:36-8; 
1990:26). The traditional African’s daily life is ruled by the spirits of his ancestors to 
such an extent that they take the place which the Christian would ascribe to God (as 
d ifferentiated  according to  His three persons). R ituals, w itchcraft and tradional 
medicine are all focused upon the ‘divine’ or ‘devilish’ influence which the spirit world 
has (for b e tte r or for worse; for good or for evil) upon a person’s daily life (cf. 
Bourdillon, 1987:147ff;171-282; Aschwanden, 1989:126ff; Gelfand et al„ 1985:3-34). 
One could therefore use the term worship in stead of veneration, even though some 
A fricans tend  to pro test tha t ancestors are  only ‘revered ’ not ‘w orshipped’ (cf. 
Parrinder, 1968:24;57ff). Although this rather tends to bind the African to the past, 
whilst the evolutionary New Age organistic view would focus on the future, both these 
views recognise the presence of approachable spirits who have direct influence over 
our lives. This may be a point of contact betw een the two, and the modernising 
African may find it easy to cross the bridge to Western occultism.
4.5 ‘Holism’
The African view of man and society is ‘holistic’ in a certain sense of the word: it does 
not contain basic W estern distinctions such as theory versus practice, sacred versus 
profane, individual versus social, but intuites life as a totality (cf. Ruch, 1984:101-160; 
Anyanwu, 1984a&b). The vital force is both bodily and spiritual - these two are not 
opposed - for it is a force which the ancestral spirits possess in greater measure than 
ourselves, but which also determines our bodily health. The typical African, Van der 
Walt (1978:44) says, thinks in totalities, rather than in clearcut analytical categories 
and cause-effect-relationships (which makes this thought inherently anti-mechanistic). 
Amongst the Shona the unity of God is reflected in the wholeness and unity of the 
world (Aschwanden, 1989:123ff). And socially, the African is communalistic, in the 
extreme sense that the individual does not only have the infrastructure in common with 
his fellow tribe-members, but that his whole being depends on the community (Van der 
W alt, 1990:32ff; 45ff). C om pare  L eopold  S enghor’s d escrip tion  of th is with 
MacLaine’s understanding of man’s place in the cosmos:
Senghor.
Thus (he Negro-African sympathizes, abandons his personality to becom c identified with the 
other, dies to be reborn in the other. He does not assimilate; he is assimilated. He lives a 
common life with the other; he lives in a symbiosis ... ‘I think, therefore I am’ Descartes writes;
... The Negro-African could say: ‘I feci, I dance with the other; I am ... (Van der Walt, 1978:39.)
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MacLaine’.
Life itself seemed only symbolic of the soul, as though it were only thought essence which would 
... never die. Life was God once removed. And everything was energy. Vibrating, pulsating 
vital ener$r. And that energy was love energy expressing itself in millions of ways until it finally 
understood the totality of itself. (Maclaine, 1985:363.)
As the new physics and the ancient mystics now seemed to agree ... that we are in fact only 
dancing with our own consciousness. Everything we feel, think, and act upon is interrelated with 
everything everyone else feels, thinks, and acts upon. We are all participating in the dance. 
(Maclaine, 1985:420.)
Clearly, they are not very far from each other, although Senghor focuses on social 
relationships, whilst MacLaine is more concerned with cosmic ones.
4.6 Direct experience
Traditionally, the African lives by direct experience, near to his emotions, intuitions, and 
instincts. H e is neare r to the R om antic experiential approach than to  K antian 
rationalism  or m echanistic quantification  (Anyanwu, 1984a,b&c; V an der W alt, 
1978:42-4; 1990:38ff). Again this aligns traditional African thought with twentieth 
century irrationalism, for example Bergson’s theory of the intuition, as Senghor (Van 
der Walt, 1978:43) has also realised. And the New Age Movement is drenched in this 
kind of irrationalism: their supposition of an inevitable cultural transition to an era of 
right brain dominance (or at least brain lobe balance) bears evidence of this (cf. Capra, 
1984:1-37). So do the mystic, spiritistic and bodily experiences (the latter induced by 
acupuncture) of MacLaine and others. Within this kind of gnoseological context, the 
lines of division between theory and practice, and subject and object, for the New Age 
Movement become blurred, whilst Africa never had such a division:
The African culture makes no sharp distinction between the Ego and the world, subject and 
object. In the conflict between the self and the world, African culture makes the self the centre 
of the world. ... every experience and reality itself are personal. ... Personal experience refers 
to the totality of man and his faculties. ... n o t ... to reason alone, imagination alone, feeling and 
intuition alone ... The truth of this experience is lived and felt, not merely thought of. ... The 
self vivifies and animates the world so that the soul, spirit, or mind of the self is also that of the 
world. (Anyanwu, 1984a:86-87.)
If one com pares this quote with the previous one from M acLaine, the connection 
between holism  and experience provides another similarity (of analogical coherence)
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between traditional African and New Age gnoseology. Experiencing the totality is ego­
centric in both conceptions.
4.7 Conclusion
When one considers the very definite similarities between the traditional African life 
view and the organistic world view in its New Age form, this spells out a new task for 
the Christian university and college. The New Age world view is propagated as an all- 
encompassing spirituality (rejecting the sacred-profane-dualism  adopted by many 
Christians), much like African spirituality (cf. Ruch, 1984:120ff; Van der Walt, 1978:34­
5; 1990:28ff). More important, as MacLaine states, this spirituality is "identical with 
understanding scientific principles": it will therefore be preached (as is already the 
case), in the universities of the W estern world, and through especially postgraduate 
students and academic conferences, be transm itted to our African universities. This 
new scientistic, pagan spirituality has no confessional discipline, no church authority 
which will prevent those who may differ in certain respects from becoming part of the 
movement. It propagates its ideas with the help of informal networks, in which a wide 
variety of doctrines may occur. It will certainly attract the African student, and may 
even alienate those who are still caught in the religio-cultural tensions (cf. for example 
Lagerwerf, 1987) of the recently converted from the Gospel. (Syntheses of traditional 
African ideas with Western ones are not uncommon: in the many independent Chur­
ches traditional religion is blended with Christianity; in the political arena communa- 
lism was blended with Western socialism; it is thus to be expected that New Ages ideas 
may be accommodated in the same way.)
Christians should not be seduced into a false choice between the mechanistic and the 
organistic world views. As pictures with lim ited applications, they may serve as 
explanatory metaphors, but expanded into world views, both of them produce reduc­
tionist, scientistic views of life and the world, which do not account for the pluriformity 
of the universe, and m an’s cultural responsibility in it. For the start of a Christian, 
critical analysis of these world views, the reader is referred  to  Hooykaas (1972), 
MacKay (1974) and Kriel (1988).
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